Privacy preserving search services against online attack by ZHAO, Yi et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Computing and 
Information Systems School of Computing and Information Systems 
8-2020 






See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research 
 Part of the Information Security Commons 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Computing and Information 
Systems at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems by an authorized administrator of Institutional 
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email cherylds@smu.edu.sg. 
Author 
Yi ZHAO, Jianting NIAN, Kaitai LIANG, Yanqi ZHAO, Liqun CHEN, and Bo YANG 
Privacy preserving search services against online attack  
Yi Zhaoa,b,c , Jianting Ningd,e, Kaitai Liangf  Yanqi Zhaob,c, Liqun Chenf, Bo Yang b,c,∗ 
a School of Information Engineering, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China  
b School of Computer Science, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an 710062, China  
c State Key Laboratory of Information Security Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
Beijing 10 0 093, China  
d Department of Computer Science, Fujian Normal University, China  
e Department of Computer Science, Singapore Management University, Singapore  
f Department of Computer Science, University of Surrey, UK 
 
Published in Computers and Security, August 2020, 95, 101836, pp. 1-10. DOI: 
10.1016/j.cose.2020.101836 
Abstract: Searchable functionality is provided in many online services such as mail services or outsourced data 
storage. To protect users privacy, data in these services is usually stored after being encrypted using searchable 
encryption. This enables the data user to securely search encrypted data from a remote server without leaking data 
and query information. Public key encryption with keyword search is one of the research branches of searchable 
encryption; this provides privacy-preserving searchable functionality for applications such as encrypted email 
systems. However, it has an inherent vulnerability in that the information of a query may be leaked using a keyword 
guessing attack. Most of existing works aim to make the system resistant to offline keyword guessing, but this does 
not protect against online attacks on real world services. In this paper, we move a step forward to present a generic 
framework able to resist online keyword guessing attack using a server-assisted model. Specifically, we design a 
novel primitive C mirrored all-but-one lossy encryption, which can prevent a specific user from generating valid 
encryptions. This primitive can be seen as an access control on encryption ability. Combining searchable encryption 
technique with the new primitive makes online keyword guessing attack impossible for the specified user, even if the 
attack is launched online. We further give formal security analysis for the generic framework, and a concrete 
implementation with efficiency analysis to show that our design is practical. 
Keywords: Keyword search, Encrypted data, Security, Online keyword guessing attack 
 
1. Introduction 
Searchable functionality is popular in many online 
services like email system and data storage. One can 
search his email box with date to find the emails he 
received at the date. Or one can also use keywords to 
find out those goods with names which contain the 
keywords in online shopping. However, searching by 
keywords makes a threat to user’s privacy. For example, 
attackers can use data mining technology to analyse the 
search history of an online merchant user to determine 
his hobby or income range. So in practice, some 
cryptographic tools are used in the protocol to protect 
privacy, like encrypted email systems. 
Encryption technologies (e.g., AES(Advanced 
Encryption Standard), DES (Data Encryption Standard), 
RSA (Rivest et al., 1978) have been widely employed in 
real-world applications, such as ProtonMail1 and 
SpiderOak2, to protect the confidentiality of client data. 
However, the encryption may prevent further operations 
 
1 https://protonmail.com/. 
over encrypted data. For instance, making use of RSA to 
encrypt emails and further store the encryptions to a 
remote server that makes search over data somewhat 
impossible on server side. This is because server may 
not be shared decryption rights by clients. There are 
some naive approaches to enable server to search over 
encrypted emails. One solution is to persuade clients to 
share secret keys with server, so that server can first 
decrypt and further search over plain data. This, 
however, may infringe the privacy of clients and 
meanwhile, it may not be necessary for clients to share 
fully trust with server. Another solution could be that 
clients downloads all encrypted emails to local and 
further fulfil throughout search over decryption. 
Although leaking no email information to server, this 
solution may yield heavy bandwidth and computational 
cost  
2 https://spideroak.com 
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to clients (for example, a client only would like to search one file 
but needs to download the whole encrypted email database). 
Searchable encryption (SE) is introduced to tackle the above 
dilemma in the sense that a client only needs to send a search to- 
ken (embedded with some keyword) to server so that the server 
is able to fulfil search over encrypted data and return the cor- 
responding matching encrypted data without accessing underly- 
ing data and query content. Symmetric searchable encryption (SSE) 
(e.g., Du et al., 2018; Song et al., 20 0 0 ) and public key encryption 
with keyword search (PEKS) (e.g., Boneh et al., 2004 ) are the two 
main search branches of SE so far. This paper will deal with the 
latter. 
The first notion of PEKS is introduced in Boneh et al. (2004) . 
PEKS is a general implementation of SE in public key context 
without using symmetric key distribution. This mechanism has at- 
tracted increasing attention in academic research and industry be- 
cause it can provide versatile search functionalities for different se- 
curity requirements in cloud storage services, such as mobile cloud 
applications ( Liu et al., 2015 ) and electronic health record appli- 
cations ( Gritti et al., 2014 ). Under the framework of PEKS, a data 
sender usually encrypts files under receiver’s public key and pre- 
pares an encrypted index structure corresponding to the encrypted 
files, and further sends both to a server. While needing to search 
and download files, the receiver generates a search token (here- 
after, we refer to search token as search trapdoor) of some key- 
word and sends it to the server. With the trapdoor, the server 
makes some computation for searching and returns the matching 
(encrypted) results. 
In general, a PEKS scheme can be implemented by an anony- 
mous identity based encryption (IBE) Boneh et al. (2004) . Keyword 
takes the role of identity and its corresponding secret key can be 
seen as a search trapdoor. When a trapdoor can be used to ob- 
tain a valid plaintext from the encryption under a keyword, the 
search is completed and the corresponding encrypted message is 
sent to the user. Since the construction is based on anonymous IBE, 
the keyword embedded into the search token will not be revealed 
by the server. In PEKS, the security concern is mainly about the 
leakage of query keyword which may result in information leak of 
search/access pattern and even the content of file. As pointed in 
Abdalla et al. (2008) , the construction of PEKS requires the under- 
lying IBE to be anonymous so that adversary can not determine the 
underlying keyword of a given encrypted file. However, Byun et al. 
(2006) found that given a trapdoor, an adversary can launch effi- 
cient attacks just by guessing and testing a search because it can 
encrypt “dummy” files from public key and any keyword as will. 
Therefore, the original scheme in Boneh et al. (2004) needs a se- 
cure channel to prevent outside attackers from launching keyword 
guessing attacks. To solve this problem, Rhee et al. (2009) and Fang 
et al. (2013) proposed schemes without leveraging secure channel. 
They put server’s public key in the encryption algorithm so that 
only the one with corresponding secret key can fulfil a correct 
search test. This designated scheme is called secure channel free 
(SCF) because the trapdoor can be transmitted in public channel. 
Many practical cases may need stronger security requirements 
than that of only achieving security against outside attackers. 
Cloud based service clients usually don’t want to make others (in- 
cluding server) be able to infringe their privacy and data security. 
And moreover, it is indeed that service provider can cause dam- 
age much severer than outside attackers. But the vulnerability from 
server’s keyword guessing attack (KGA) seems inherent in original 
framework of PEKS because server is supposed to have trapdoor 
(given by clients) and (self-generated) encrypted files, simultane- 
ously, which can be seen as the “knowledge database”. Therefore, 
server itself can definitely target some keywords to fulfil search 
test over the knowledge database. For example, an email server 
can send encrypted junk mails to a specified system user and use 
all search trapdoors (given by the email user) to search over the 
junk mails, which can help the server detect whether a keyword is 
embedded in those trapdoors. 
A natural approach to solve this problem is making the keyword 
“fuzzy”. Xu et al. (2013) proposed a fuzzy keyword search scheme 
in the sense that the server can only return a group of encrypted 
files so that it can not tell exactly which one is exactly needed by 
data user. However, this solution leaks the information of the range 
so that it is not formally secure against KGA. In fact if the set is 
relatively small, the server can still be able to find the right en- 
crypted file with high probability. In another direction, Chen et al. 
(2016b) presented a novel framework in which the search testing 
process was handled by two servers without collusion. Soon Chen 
et al. (2016a) tried another approach to add an aided server out- 
side the original framework because it is more convenient to han- 
dle in a blackbox way. These two schemes can successfully resist 
a weaker version of KGA, called off-line keyword guessing attack. 
This type of attack allows the server to attack by its own in off-line 
status after receiving considerable amount of trapdoors. In these 
two schemes, main server can’t do search testing in an off-line sta- 
tus without the help of assisted server. But if the two server col- 
lude together (e.g., the two server share information), the keyword 
guessing attack still exists. 
To see it in details, in Chen et al. (2016a) authors add an aided 
server and require both the sender and user to run a blind sig- 
nature protocol with it. So without the knowledge of the secret 
injected by aided server, the main server can only test but not 
obtain any information of keyword. This result requires that the 
attack happens when aided server is off-line so the main server 
can not do the same thing as users. In practice, the time of at- 
tack is hard to anticipate so asking aided server to work off-line 
to avoid communication with main server seems impossible. Al- 
though they showed some mechanism to slow down the online 
key word guessing attack, this scheme does not rule out this type 
of attack because main server can query the aided server to inject 
the same secret to its guessing keyword and then test. So we can 
see that separating tester and encrypter is the way to resist online 
attack. That means test server are unable to generate PEKS cipher- 
text but only does the test. 
1.1. Our contribution 
We find that it can go further from existing two independent 
servers framework to resist stronger and online type of keyword 
guessing attack without adding new participants. Our scheme em- 
ploys a new primitive to rule out “honest-registration online at- 
tack” in the framework of Chen et al. (2016a) . In this kind of attack 
main server can query the aided server online even in malicious 
way like impersonating existing users, but it won’t register valid 
dummy users. This model has practical value because most real 
applications today require registration with real identity verifica- 
tion. So registering dummy users to launch attack is not efficient 
and easily traceable. Moreover, we show how to adapt our scheme 
to handle with attacks allowing dummy users to most extent. Our 
main contributions can be listed as follows: 
• Combining the notions of lossy encryption and key exchange 
protocol, we propose a novel primitive called mirrored all-but- 
one (ABO) lossy encryption. “mirrored” here means the security 
of this primitive is just the same as normal ABO lossy encryp- 
tion schemes, except that while in normal case lossy branch is 
hidden to adversary and evaluation keys is public, this primitive 
uses the lossy branch known by adversary but makes compu- 
tations on branches which is hidden. A special property of this 
scheme is that the “one” is even deprived of the capability to 
encrypt. 
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Table 1 
Security comparison. 
scheme CKA Offline KGA Online KGA 
Boneh et al. (2004) 
√ × ×
Xu et al. (2013) 
√ 
Partial Partial 
Chen et al. (2016a) 
√ √ ×
Ours 
√ √ √ 
• With the new primitive, we propose our new PEKS scheme. 
Users are asked to encrypt messages to aided server through 
this scheme instead of sending directly. All valid users can run 
this protocol with aided server to obtain valid signature but 
only when the main server communicates with aided server it 
doesn’t work. Even if the server sends the message on other 
valid users’ behalf, the server still can’t obtain any valid signa- 
ture and the process is oblivious to the aided server. We for- 
malize the security model and give generic construction with 
proof for this primitive. By combining classic blind signature 
scheme in Chen et al. (2016a) and ABO lossy encryption to build 
an ABO blind signature scheme, we can obtain a PEKS scheme 
secure against stronger type of keyword guessing attack. The 
security improvement can be seen in Table 1 . 
1.2. Related works 
Other Type of Searchable Encryption. Apart from the aforemen- 
tioned PEKS systems, there have been some variants of PEKS 
in the literature. Bellare et al. (2007) made use of determinis- 
tic encryption as a tradeoff between security and efficiency. Wang 
et al. Wang et al. (2007) leveraged dynamic accumulators to sup- 
port the searchability in the context of multiple readers and writ- 
ers. Hwang and Lee (2007) proposed a PEKS with conjunctive 
keyword search supporting multiuser. He et al. (2018) presented 
certificateless PEKS for internet of things context. Some research 
works have extended PEKS in the attribute-based setting to en- 
hance search expressiveness, e.g., attribute-based searchable en- 
cryption ( Han et al., 2018; Meng et al., 2017 ), regular language 
search ( Liang et al., 2016a ) and attribute-based search with shar- 
ing mechanisms ( Liang et al., 2016b; Liang and Susilo, 2015 ). To 
see how attacks work on SE schemes, we refer to readers that Ning 
et al. (2019) investigates the vulnerability of SSE schemes based on 
the assumptions on how much prior knowledge an attacker is al- 
lowed to achieve and further presented a series of passive attacks. 
Besides ( Du et al., 2018 ) considers forward privacy in dynamic 
updatable SSE. However, the problem that resisting online attack 
from main server who stores the ciphertext in PEKS is still open. 
Lossy primitives. We employ the notion of ‘lossy’ cryptographic 
primitives in our construction. The idea of lossy primitives was 
originated from dual mode encryption in Peikert et al. (2008) . This 
type of primitives usually have two working modes which can not 
be distinguished by attackers. The injective mode is used in normal 
setting and lossy mode is used in proof. This trick provides novel 
approaches for many problems. To find minimal assumptions for 
public key encryption (PKE) secure against chosen ciphertext at- 
tack (CCA), Peikert and Waters proposed the notion of lossy trap- 
door functions (LTFs) ( Peikert and Waters, 2011 ). To address the 
problem of PKE secure against selective opening chosen cipertext 
attack (SO-CCA), Bellare et al. defined lossy encryption and gave 
constructions from LTFs ( Bellare et al., 2009 ). There are many vari- 
ants of LTFs with different number of lossy branches, like all-but- 
one (ABO) LTFs ( Peikert and Waters, 2011 ), all-but-N (ABN) LTFs 
( Hemenway et al., 2011 ) and all-but-many (ABM) LTFs ( Hofheinz, 
2012 ). In this paper, we will employ corresponding invariants in 
lossy encryption. Specifically, we will combine key exchange pro- 
tocol and ABO lossy encryption with blind signature to provide ac- 
cess control for PEKS to rule out just main server. 
1.3. Organization 
The rest part of this paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2 we introduce preliminaries needed. Then we present 
mirrored ABO lossy encryption protocol with security model and 
proof in Section 3 . With the primitive we build two-server frame- 
work PEKS secure against online keyword guessing attack in 
Section 4 . The remaining sections are performance and conclusion. 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section we introduce some knowledge which will be 
used in following sections. 
2.1. Lossy primitives 
2.1.1. (ABO) Lossy trapdoor functions 
A collection of LTFs is a collection of publicly computable func- 
tions which are indexed by a set of public key { s }. Every public 
key is associated with a branch which is used to generate the key. 
There are two kinds of public keys, injective and lossy. Functions 
indexed by injective ones can be reversed to find pre-image. Func- 
tions indexed by lossy keys have smaller size of image than that 
of domain. We called the branch according to the former “injec- 
tive branch” and the other “lossy branch”. “lossy” means the im- 
age of the function working on these branches loses part of the in- 
formation of the pre-image. We use a generalized notion to incor- 
porate exponential lossy branches. Let { B n } denote a collection of 
branch sets and { B ∗n } denote the corresponding collection of lossy 
branch sets. We recall the definition of ABO-LTFs Peikert and Wa- 
ters (2011) below. If { B n } contains two elements only, it is just the 
standard LTF. 
A collection of ( n, k ) ABO-LTFs is composed of 3 probabilistic 
polynomial time (PPT) algorithms: 
G abo : Take λ ∈ N and b ∗ ∈ B λ as input, output (s, td, B ∗λ) , where 
s is a function index, td is its trapdoor and B ∗
λ
is the set of lossy 
branches that b ∗ ∈ B ∗
λ
. 
F abo and F 
−1 
abo : For any b ∈ B λ \ B ∗λ, F abo ( s, b , · ) computes an in- 
jective function f s,b ( · ) over the domain {0, 1} n , and F −1 abo (s, td, b, ·) 
computes f −1 
s,b (td, ·) . For any b ∈ B ∗λ, F abo ( s, b , · ) computes a func- 
tion f s,b ( · ) over the domain {0, 1} n whose image size is at most 
2 k . 
There are two security requirements for ABO-LTFs: 
Index indistinguishability: The ensemble s ← G abo (λ, b ∗0 ) and 
s ← G abo (λ, b ∗1 ) are computationally indistinguishable. 
Lossy branch hidden: Any PPT adversary A who takes ( s, b ) as 
input, where ( s, td, B ∗) ← G abo ( λ, b ∗), has only a negligible proba- 
bility to find a lossy branch b ′ such that b ′  = b and b ′ ∈ B ∗. And 
even b ∈ B ∗, the probability is still negligible. 
The above two properties can be used in the security proof. 
Usually the initial injective experiment can be changed to a lossy 
experiment via indistinguishability. And then using the second 
property to draw conclusions. In this paper, we will use lossy mode 
directly in practice. 
2.1.2. Lossy encryption 
Similar to LTFs, lossy public key encryption (LPKE) is a kind of 
PKE that has two working modes decided by its public key. The 
definitional difference between normal PKE and lossy one is just 
the key generation algorithm. Naturally, LPKE can be instantiated 
by LTFs. 
A lossy encryption scheme is composed of 3 algorithms ( G, E, 
D ) satisfying: 
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1. Key generation algorithm G can generate two kinds of keys. 
G (1 λ, inj ) generates injective keys and G (1 λ, lossy ) generates 
lossy keys. 
2. Under injective keys, encryption algorithm E and decryption al- 
gorithm D can work correctly. That is Pr [ D (sk, E(pk, x ; r)) = x ] = 
1 where r is a random factor. 
Under lossy keys, the generated ciphertext can’t be properly de- 
crypted. The schematic diagram is as follows. 
G (1 λ, ·) = 
{
pk in j , E(pk in j , m ) = C in j , D (sk, E(pk in j , C in j )) = m 
pk loss , E(pk loss , m ) = C loss , D (sk, E(pk loss , C loss )) = ⊥ . 
LPKE has the same secure property as LTFs. The two kinds 
of keys should be indistinguishable and information of plain text 
would be lost under lossy keys. Lossy branch hidden property is 
also implied, even if we extend this notion to ABO setting. 
A simple construction of ABO lossy encryption from ABO LTFs 
and pair-wise independent hash function H is as follows: 
• G : Run G abo with b 
∗ to obtain (s, td, B ∗
λ
) . The public key is s . 
• E : The ciphertext is computed as c = (c 1 , c 2 ) = 
((F abo (s, td, b, x ) , b) , H(x )  m ) where x and b are chosen 
randomly, and m is the message. 
• D : Given a ciphertext C , if b  = b ∗ compute d = F −1 
abo (s, b, c 1 ) , 
then m = c 2  d. 
2.2. Non-interactive key exchange 
Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a collection of 3 algo- 
rithms ( Setup, Keygen, Sharedkey ) as follows. 
• Setup : Generate a set of public parameters which both parties 
agree on. 
• Keygen : Each party uses this algorithm to generate their own 
key pair ( pk, sk ). 
• Sharedkey : On input one party’s public key and the other party’s 
secret key, output the shared key. This algorithm is commuta- 
tive that we can change the party’s role and the result remains 
the same. Specifically, given ( ID 1 , pk 1 , sk 1 ) and ( ID 2 , pk 2 , sk 2 ), 
Sharedkey (I D 1 , I D 2 , pk 1 , sk 2 ) = Sharedkey (I D 2 , I D 1 , pk 2 , sk 1 ) . 
Security model: Usually a NIKE scheme is proved secure in CKS 
model which is proposed by Cash et al. (2009) . This model allows 
adversary to query honestly generated public keys, shared key be- 
tween existing honest users, associate public keys with other IDs 
or register dishonest users. With these abilities, the adversary still 
can not distinguish the shared key with randomness. We first fo- 
cus on a widely implemented situation that CA needs verification 
with real identities (by text codes to cell phone etc.) for user reg- 
istration so that registering dishonest users is not efficient. In this 
weaker case, Diffie–Hellman protocol is sufficient for implementa- 
tion. Then we will show how to handle the case in which the ad- 
versary can register dummy users. In this case, we can adopt the 
NIKE scheme in Cash et al. (2009) . 
2.3. Blind signature 
A blind signature scheme contains 5 algorithms including 
( BS.gen, BS.blind, BS.sign, BS.unblind, BS.ver ): 
• BS.gen : On input security number, signer runs this algorithm to 
generate verification key vk and signing key sk s . 
• BS.blind : On input a message m , output a blinded message m ′ . 
User sends m ′ to the signer. 
• BS.sign : On receiving m ′ , signer invokes signing algorithm to 
output a blinded signature s ′ . 
• BS.unblind : On input a blinded signature s ′ , output an original 
signature s . 
• BS.ver : On input ( vk, m, s ), output 1 or 0. 
A blind signature scheme should satisfy two security require- 
ment. 
• Blindness: The signer are unable to link any user with certain 
signed message. Formally, after two users ID 0 and ID 1 run the 
protocol with signer to obtain message-signature pair ( m 0 , s 0 ) 
and ( m 1 , s 1 ) respectively. Then choose b ∈ {0, 1} randomly and 
send ( m b , s b ) to the signer, the signer outputs a guess b 
′ . De- 
fine the advantage Adv blind = | Pr [ b ′ = b] − 1 / 2 | . The advantage 
is negligible against adversarial signer. 
• Unforgeability: This is the same as normal security requirement 
of a signature scheme. 
2.4. Public key encryption with key word search 
Public key encryption with key word search (PEKS) is a collec- 
tion of 4 algorithms as follows: A lossy encryption scheme is com- 
posed of 6 algorithms ( Kgen R , PEKS, Trapdoor, Test ) as follows: 
• Kgen R ( λ): Receivers run this algorithm to generate public/secret 
key pair ( pk R , sk R ). 
• PEKS ( pk R , w ): The server receives PEKS ciphertext CT w gener- 
ated by this algorithm. 
• Trapdoor ( sk R , w ): Receivers generate trapdoor T w by this algo- 
rithm. 
• Test ( CT w , T w ): Server runs this algorithm to test whether the 
ciphertext is the one receiver is searching for. Let the output be 
true/false. 
Security definition: 
The standard security requirement is that a PEKS scheme 
should be secure against keyword chosen attack (KCA). Our aim is 
to resist keyword guessing attack and this primitive is one building 
block so we omit the details of traditional CKA security here. 
3. Mirrored ABO lossy encryption 
We present this novel primitive to control the capability of en- 
crypting messages in public key setting. This can be used to sepa- 
rate the role of encrypter and tester for main server in SA-PEKS. 
3.1. Definition and security model 
A mirrored ABO lossy encryption scheme is composed of 6 al- 
gorithms ( PP, Bgen, Brec, Gen, Enc, Dec ) as follows: 
• PP ( λ): On input security parameters, output public parameters 
which all parties agree on, including the basic information like 
the group, hash function and index IND i for every user. 
• Bgen ( λ, IND i ): Every user indexed by IND i runs this algorithm 
to generate a branch b i for encryption between the receiver and 
itself. 
• Brec ( IND i ): The receiver can recover the branch b i used in en- 
cryption according to sender IND i . 
• Gen ( λ, IND ∗): On input parameter λ and an chosen IND ∗, out- 
put key pair ( lpk, lsk ) for receiver. The corresponding branch for 
IND ∗ is b ∗. 
• Enc ( lpk, IND i , m ): On input a branch b i corresponding IND i and 
a message m , output ciphertext ( C, IND i ) where IND i is the 
sender’s index. 
• Dec ( lsk, C, IND i , b 
∗): First compute b ′ = Brec(IND i ) . If b ′ = b ∗, 
output reject ; Otherwise, compute m = Dec(lsk, C, IND ) . 
Secure against chosen plaintext attack (CPA): In injective mode, 
the encryption satisfies standard CPA security notion against every 
user. 
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• Lossiness: Given Enc ( lpk, b ∗, m ), m has large entropy that any 
adversary can recover the original m with only negligible prob- 
ability. 
• Branch Hidden: For m ∈ M , { C = Enc(l pk, b, m ) ; b ← 
Bgen (λ, IND ) } = c { C = Enc(l pk, b, m ) ; b ← Rand} . 
• Incapability of encryption: For the user ID ∗ associated branch 
b ∗, it can generate a valid encryption only with negligible prob- 
ability. We define this property in the game between a chal- 
lenger and an adversary below: 
− Init: The adversary with IND ∗ runs Bgen ( λ, IND ∗) to obtain 
its own branch b ∗. The challenger computes b ∗ = Brec(IND ∗) 
and runs Gen ( λ, b ∗) to generate ( lpk, lsk ). Then send lpk to 
the adversary. 
− Query: The adversary can query any IND ’s valid ciphertext 
without the knowledge of message. 
− Forge: The adversary outputs a tuple ( m, C, IND ). 
If the adversary can output a valid ciphertext such that m = 
Dec(lsk, C, IND ) , we say the adversary win this game. 
Remark: Lossiness is the property of standard lossy encryption. 
CPA security against outside attackers and injective inside users 
also remains from original ABO LPKE. But CPA security against the 
lossy user (we call it mirrored CPA security because the adversary 
knows lossy branch now) is not a natural result. Branch hidden 
property is implied by incapability of encryption. But it is more 
clear to state it formally which can help the reader to understand 
the difference from original version. In classic ABO lossy encryp- 
tion, lossy branch is hidden to adversary and evaluation branch is 
public. Here the situation is reversed. 
3.2. Construction 
To realize a mirrored ABO lossy encryption scheme, it is re- 
quired to assign every user a branch so that the user which is des- 
ignated to be the one who can not generate valid ciphertext can be 
attached with lossy branch. A convenient approach to assign every 
user a branch is using key exchange protocol to obtain a shared 
key between receiver and every user as the user’s branch. And by 
the property of key exchange protocol, the information of branch 
is hidden to other users except receiver and user themselves. This 
can help to inherit the CPA security against outside attackers from 
original lossy encryption scheme. The public key for encryption is 
generated after key exchange setup so that the receiver can assign 
one shared key as lossy branch. 
We give a construction of mirrored ABO lossy encryption from 
a NIKE scheme ( Setup, Keygen, Sharedkey ), a collision resistent hash 
function H and a standard ABO LPKE scheme ( G, E, D ) as follows. 
• PP : Invoke Setup and to generate public parameters. 
• Bgen : Each party with ID i runs Keygen to generate ( Spk i , Ssk i ). 
Denote the receiver’s key pair as ( Spk R , Ssk R ) and the adver- 
sary’s key pair as (Spk A , Ssk A ) . Set I ND i = (I D i , Spk i ) . Then b i = 
H(Sharedkey (Ssk i , Spk R )) . 
• Brec ( IND ): For the sender with index I ND i = (I D i , Spk i ) , com- 
pute b i = H(Sharedkey (Spk i , Ssk R )) . 
• Gen ( λ, b ∗): Set b ∗ = H(Sharedkey (Spk A , Ssk R )) , and run G to ob- 
tain ( s, td ). Let (l pk = s, lsk = td) . 
• Enc ( lpk, IND i , m ): Every user with index IND i uses correspond- 
ing b i and message m to invoke E ( lpk, m, b i ). The output is ( C, 
ID i ) ( Spk i in IND can be omitted). 
• Dec ( lsk, C, IND i ): Given ( C, ID i ), first run Brec ( IND i ) to compute 
b i . Then invoke D ( lsk, C, b i ) to obtain m . 
3.3. Security 
Theorem 1. Given a NIKE scheme ( Setup, Keygen, Sharedkey ) secure 
in CKS model, a collision resistant hash function H and a standard 
ABO LPKE scheme ( G, E, D ), the construction above is CPA secure 
against an adversary which is designated with lossy branch b ∗. 
Proof. Let A be an adversary to attack CPA security. We build an 
algorithm B which plays the challenger for A to attack the security 
of NIKE scheme in CKS model as follows. 
• Setup: On input parameters from NIKE challenger, B issues a 
honest user register query with a extract query to obtain ( Spk R , 
Ssk R ) and sends Spk R with parameters to A . Adversary sup- 
plies Spk A to B. Then B issues a corrupt user register query 
(A , Spk A ) and a reveal query (A , B) to obtain b ∗. Finally, B in- 
vokes Gen ( λ, b ∗) to generate ( pk, sk ) and sends pk to A . 
• Query: A submits ( m, ID ) as the query for valid encryption. B
issues a honest user register query for ID with a reveal query 
(ID, B) to obtain shared key b ID . Then it computes (C, ID ) = 
Enc(pk, IND, m ) which is sent to A . 
• Challenge: A submit two messages ( m 0 , m 1 , ID ∗) to B . B issues 
a test query (B, ID ∗) to obtain a challenge key b ∗ which is as- 
sociated with ID ∗. B flips a coin r ∈ {0, 1}, and computes the 
challenge ciphertext (C ∗, ID ∗) = Enc(pk, IND ∗, m b ∗ ) and sends it 
to A . A outputs a guess r ′ . If Pr [ r ′ = r] − 1 / 2 > negl(λ) , B out- 
puts 1; Otherwise it outputs 0. 
If b ∗ is computed from a random generated key then the chal- 
lenge ciphertext is random and A can just guess with no advan- 
tage. So we can conclude that if A can win the game in non- 
negligible advantage, B can distinguish b ∗ from random keys. 
This completes the reduction. 
Theorem 2. Given a NIKE scheme ( Setup, Keygen, Sharedkey ) secure 
in CKS model, a collision resistent hash function H and a standard 
ABO LPKE scheme ( G, E, D ), an adversary which is designated with 
lossy branch b ∗ can generate a valid encryption of the scheme above 
only with negligible probability. 
Proof. Let A be an adversary to attack incapability of encryption 
property. We build an algorithm B which plays the challenger for 
A to attack the security of NIKE scheme in CKS model as follows. 
• Init: On input parameters from NIKE challenger, B issues a hon- 
est user register query with a extract query to obtain ( Spk R , 
Ssk R ) and sends Spk R with parameters to A . Adversary sup- 
plies Spk A to B. Then B issues a corrupt user register query 
(A , Spk A ) and a reveal query (A , B) to obtain b ∗. Finally, B in- 
vokes Gen ( λ, b ∗) to generate ( pk, sk ) and sends pk to A . 
• Query: A submits ID as the query for valid encryption. B issues 
a honest user register query for ID with a reveal query (ID, B) 
to obtain shared key b ID . Then it randomly chooses a message 
m and computes (C, ID ) = Enc(pk, IND, m ) which is sent to A . 
• Forge: A outputs a tuple ( m, C ∗, ID ∗). B issues a test query 
(B, ID ∗) to obtain a challenge key b ∗ which is associated with 
ID ∗. If m = Dec(sk, C ∗, IND ∗) , B outputs 1; Otherwise it outputs 
0. 
The reduction follows directly. If the forged cyphertext is valid 
then b ∗ is the shared key with probability 1. Otherwise b ∗ is ran- 
domly chosen. Thus we can conclude that if A can generate a valid 
encryption with non-negligible probability, then B can break the 
security of NIKE scheme in CKS model also with non-negligible 
probability. 
3.4. Concrete construction 
We give a concrete construction in this section. The building 
blocks includes a NIKE scheme in Cash et al. (2009) and an ABO- 
LPKE from Paillier encryption scheme ( Paillier, 1999 ) following the 
approach in Hemenway and Ostrovsky (2012) . 
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• PP : On input security parameter λ, output a collision resistant 
hash function H 1 that maps any string to l < log N − 3 − λ bit 
string, and a cyclic group G with generator g and prime order 
p 1 . 
• Bgen : Each party ID i chooses its secret key ( x i , y i ) and publishes 
public key as (X i = g x i , Y i = g y i ) . Every party computes a shared 
key with receiver ID R that Shardkey i = (g x 1 x R , g x 1 y R , g y 1 x R , g y 1 y R ) . 
• Gen ( λ, b ∗): On input security parameter λ, receiver outputs a 
composite N = pq where p and q are large primes with same 
length as well as a hash function H 2 which maps any string to 
Z N . Then it chooses an ID 
∗ as a lossy identity and computes 
b ∗ = H 2 (Shardkey i ) . Then it generates public key as pk = (1 + 
N ) b 
∗
r N mod N 2 . 
• Brec ( IND ): On input IND , output the branch as b i = 
H 2 (Shardkey i ) . 
• Enc ( lpk, IND i , m ): When ID i encrypts an l bit long message m , 
it computes C = (C 1 , C 2 ) = ((1 + N ) b i r N /pk ) x mod N 2 , H 1 (x )  m ) 
and send ( C, ID ). 




1 mod N 
2 ] − 1) /N ˙ φ(N) −1 mod N, m = C 2  H 1 (x ′ ) . 
3.5. Applications 
This primitive can easily be embedded in a protocol with other 
primitives. As an example, we will modify the standard blind sig- 
nature procedure that the first message is required to be sent un- 
der ABO lossy encryption. As a result, certain user is excluded to 
obtain valid signature while other users keep the same function- 
ality as original. In a formal proof, the challenger can respond the 
query on signatures with random value for the excluded adversary. 
4. SA-PEKS Secure against online keyword guessing attack 
(OSA-PEKS) 
In this chapter, we give the approach to resist online attacks via 
adopting mirrored ABO lossy encryption. 
4.1. Definition and security model of OSA-PEKS 
In this section we define OSA-PEKS and give the model of on- 
line attack from honest registration. 
An OSA-PEKS scheme is composed of 8 algorithms ( OPP, OPreset, 
OKgen AS , OKgen R , ODK, OPEKS, OTrapdoor, OTest ) as follows: 
• OPP : This algorithm generates public parameters for the system 
by taking security parameters as input. 
• OPreset : This algorithm runs between aided server and users in- 
cluding main server in the initial stage for key exchange pro- 
tocol. The algorithm includes two steps: First every user gen- 
erates its own key pair and then make registration on aided 
server. Aided server maintains a list to store information of reg- 
istered users. 
• OKgen AS : On input security parameters, output parameters for 
aided server, including public/secret key pairs for access con- 
trol. 
• OKgen R : On input security parameters, output parameters for 
main server, including public/secret key pairs for encryption 
functionality in PEKS. The next 4 algorithms together with this 
one are just the same as the definition defined in Chen et al. 
(2016a) . 
• ODK : This algorithm is a protocol between sender and aided 
server which takes keyword w as input to generate derived key- 
word odk w . 
• OPEKS : Generate ciphertexts which will be sent to main server 
to be stored for search. 
• OTrapdoor : Compute trapdoor from derived keyword. 
• OTest : Check whether the ciphertext is the one matching the 
trapdoor. 
Note: There are three key generation processes in this defini- 
tion. One is for key exchange protocol to establish a simple se- 
cure channel. The one run by aided server generates keys for ac- 
cess control to exclude online inside adversary like main server. 
The other run by main server is just as the same as normal key 
generation in PEKS schemes. 
As apposed to the one more unforgeable security defined in 
Chen et al. (2016a) , we give a more general definition to capture 
online attack with honest registration for the security of OSA-PEKS. 
Security under online chosen keyword attack with honest regis- 
tration (OCKA) is defined in the game below between a challenger 
B and an adversary A . 
• Init: B runs OPP to generate public parameters. A runs OKgen R 
to obtain his own key pairs and then register his identity with 
the challenger by OP reset. B runs OKgen AS to generate key pairs 
and publishes public key after A . 
• Query: The adversary can adaptively make any query on arbi- 
trary keywords via ODK with the challenger for derived key- 
words. 
• Forge: A outputs a pair ( w, odk w ) such that odk w = ODK(w ) . 
If the adversary can forge a valid pair, we say the adversary win 
this game. The advantage is defined as Adv OCKA = Pr [ A wins ] 
If Adv OCKA < ε where ε is negligible, we say the OSA-PEKS 
scheme is OCKA secure. 
4.2. Construction of OSA-PEKS 
Given a mirrored ABO LPKE scheme ( PP, Bgen, Gen, Enc, Dec ), a 
blind signature scheme ( BS.gen, BS.blind, BS.sign, BS.unblind, BS.ver ) 
and a PEKS scheme ( Kgen, PEKS, Trapdoor, Test ), we give next 8 
algorithms for OSA-PEKS scheme in a framework with one aided 
server. The relations between primitives are shown in Fig. 2 . We 
make LBO LPKE function on the first message of the blind signature 
scheme to turn it to an ABO blind signature scheme. Then com- 
bined with the PEKS scheme, we can obtain our OSA PEKS scheme. 
• OPP ( λ): Run PP to obtain public parameters. 
• OPreset ( λ): Every party with ID i (including ID AS and ID MS ) runs 
Bgen to generate ( Spk i , Ssk i ). Every party registers the public key 
on aided server and the aided server maintains the list. 
• OKgen AS ( λ): Aided server computes b 
∗ = Brec(IND MS ) first. Then 
it runs Gen ( λ, b ∗) to obtain public/secret key pairs and ( lpk AS , 
lsk AS ). It also runs BS.gen to generate signature key pair ( vk, sk ). 
• OKgen R ( λ): Just the same as Kgen . The main server generates 
( pk R , sk R ). 
• ODK ( w, pk AS , sk AS ): Every sender computes c w = 
Enc(l pk AS , IND R , BS.blind(w )) and sends ( c w , ID S ) to the aided 
server. The aided server computes Dec ( lsk AS , IND S , c w ) to 
obtain BS.blind ( w ). Then it signs the blinded message with 
s ′ = BS.sign (BS.blind(w )) . Receiving the blinded signature the 
sender computes od k w = BS.unblind (s ′ ) . 
• OPEKS ( pk R , dk w ): Same as PEKS ( pk R , odk w ). 
• OTrapdoor ( sk R , dk w ): Same as Trapdoor ( sk R , dk w ). 
• OT est(CT dk w , T dk w ) : Same as T est(CT dk w , T dk w ) . 
The concrete communication between sender/receiver and 
aided server is shown in Table 2 . Here we give a sketch of interac- 
tions between different roles in the scheme. The whole process is 
constituted by 3 stages. In the initial stage, main server generates 
key pair for PEKS via OPP ( λ). Every party generates key pair for key 
exchange via OPreset ( λ). And Aided server generates keys for ABO 
blind signature scheme via OKgen AS ( λ). In the second stage, every 
client (including sender and user) runs ABO blind signature proto- 
col with aided server to get derived keyword. In this stage, main 
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Fig. 1. The system model. 
Fig. 2. Relations between primitives. 
Table 2 
ABO blind signature. 
Sender/receiver Aided server 
OPreset ( λ) → ( Spk i , Ssk i , b i ) OPreset ( λ) → ( Spk AS , Ssk AS ) 
OKgen AS ( λ) → ( b ∗ , lpk AS , lsk AS , vk, sk ) 
c w = Enc(lpk AS , IND R , BS.blind(w )) 
c w −→ 
BS.blind ( w ) ← Dec ( lsk AS , IND S , c w ) 
s ′ = BS.sign (BS.blind(w )) 
s ′ ← −
od k w = BS.unblind (s ′ ) 
server can also query signature from aided server but it won’t get 
a valid one. In the final stage, clients use the derived keyword to 
make trapdoors and send trapdoors to main server for search re- 
sults. 
4.3. Security 
Theorem 3. The construction above is CKA secure against online key- 
word guessing attacks assuming no dummy users registration and the 
properties of underlying ABO lossy encryption, blind signature scheme 
and PEKS schemes. 
Proof. Sketch: The proof proceeds by constructing a challenger B
as an adversary attacking normal PEKS scheme, invoking an adver- 
sary A attacking our scheme as internal procedure. If the success 
of A can lead to the success of B with non-negligible probability, 
we make a reduction that our scheme is OCKA secure as if the un- 
derlying PEKS scheme is secure. We give a sketch here because we 
would like to highlight the difference between existing proofs and 
ours. 
In the proof, B has to simulate an environment which is indis- 
tinguishable from real one for A . Thus B can transform its abil- 
ity to attack normal PEKS to the weapon to attack our scheme. 
Specifically, B needs to answer several kinds of queries from A . 
If all the answers are indistinguishable to the real ones, the sim- 
ulation succeeds. The only difference from existing proofs is that 
in our scheme adversary is allowed to get access to aided server 
now for blind signature during the derived keyword query proce- 
dure. The attacker can ask for a signature on any keyword just like 
normal sender to aided server. To simulate the answer, the chal- 
lenger can simply respond with random value because of security 
of ABO lossy encryption (Theorem 2). Any way, the responce the 
adversary obtains is not a valid signature. So the adversary are not 
able to distinguish the right response with random one. Combing 
with incapability of encryption property, we can conclude that the 
adversary gains no advantage from the added oracle. Thus the se- 
curity remains. 
4.4. Discussions 
In practice, more adversarial behaviors still exist. If the main 
server is allowed to register valid dummy users or corrupt exist- 
ing users, the keyword guessing attack can be easily launched even 
there is an identity checking process. But we can make a remedy 
if the corruption is detected. We can treat the set of lossy branch 
as a black list. LTFs which contains more lossy branches are al- 
ready existing. So if we use ABN or ABM LTFs to build ABN or ABM 
lossy encryption scheme, we can build blind signature schemes 
which do not allow multiple users to get signatures. By using this 
extended version of lossy encryption scheme, further attack will 
be stopped after detection by setting the shared key as the lossy 
branch. 
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Fig. 3. The time cost of PEKS generation algorithm. 
5. Implementation 
To make comparison we choose the same PEKS scheme and 
blind signature scheme as ( Chen et al., 2016a ) combining with our 
ABO LPKE scheme in Section 3 . 
• OPP ( λ): On input security parameter, outputs include prime or- 
der cyclic groups (G , G 1 , G T ) with generator ( g, g 1 , g T ), where 
| G | = p, | G 1 | = | G T | = p 1 . There exists a bilinear map e : G 1 ×
G 1 → G T . Outputs also include a composite which is the mul- 
tiple of two large prime N s = p s q s as well as collision resistent 
hash functions H 1 that maps any string to log| N s | bits string and 
H that maps arbitrary string to G 1 . 
• OPreset ( λ): Each party ID i chooses its secret key ( x i , y i ) 
and publishes public key as (X i = g x i , Y i = g y i ) . Every party 
computes a shared key with receiver ID R that Shardkey i = 
(ID i , g 
x 1 x R , g x 1 y R , g y 1 x R , g y 1 y R ) . 
• OKgen AS ( λ): On input security parameter λ, aided server out- 
puts a composite N e = p e q e where p e and q e are large primes 
with the same length as well as a hash function H 2 which maps 
any string to Z N . Then it sets the main server ID MS as a lossy 
identity and computes b MS = H 2 (Shardkey MS ) . Then it generates 
public key as pk = (1 + N ) b ∗ r N mod N 2 where r ∈ R Z ∗N . For signa- 
ture key pair, it chooses a verification key ˆ e and a signing key 
d that ˆ ed ≡ 1 mod N s . 
• OKgen R ( λ): Randomly choose an α and computes h = g α1 . h is 
the public key for PEKS. 
• ODK ( w, pk AS , sk AS ): Given a keyword w ∈ Z ∗N s , sender first 
blinded by choosing r 1 ← Z ∗N s to compute w ′ = r ̂ e1 w . Then it 
computes C w ′ = (C 1 , C 2 ) = ((1 + N ) b i r N 1 /pk ) x mod N 2 , H 1 (x )  w ′ ) 
and sends it to aided server. Aided server first decrypt to ob- 
tain w ′ and outputs a blind signature (w ′ , s ′ = r 1 w d ) . The de- 
rived key for PEKS is computed as odk w = H(w, r −1 1 s ′ ) . 
• OPEKS ( pk R , dk w ): With odk w , the sender picks random r 2 ← Z ∗p 1 
and computes CT = (g r 2 
1 , t = e (odk w , h r )) . 
• OTrapdoor ( sk R , dk w ): With odk w , receiver computes T = odk αw . 
• OT est(CT dk w , T dk w ) : With CT = (A, B ) , the main server checks if 
e (A, T ) = B . If it is true, return 1. Otherwise, return 0. 
5.1. Evaluation 
In this section, We implement our scheme to evaluate its effi- 
ciency, which is based on JPBC 2.0.0 library 3 and coding language 
Java. We select Type A pairings are constructed on the curve y 2 = 
x 3 + x over the field F q for some prime q = 3 mod 4 . The process 
3 http://gas.dia.unisa.it/projects/jpbc/index.html#.VTDrLSOl _ Cw. 
Fig. 4. The time cost of PEKS algorithm. 
Fig. 5. The time cost of trapdoor generation algorithm. 
of obtaining the random numbers is based on the class function 
of JPBC library 4 . We process and performance the random num- 
bers based on a random function 5 . The function uniform randomly 
chooses parameters. The following experiments are based on Dell 
laptop (Windows 7 operation system with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5- 
2450M CPU 2.50 GHz, 4.00GB RAM and 500G disk storage). We 
used Enron email dataset which was collected and prepared by 
the CALO Project (A Cognitive Assistant that Learns and Organizes). 
It contains data from about 150 users, mostly senior management 
of Enron with newer version of the dataset on May 7, 2015 Ver- 
sion. We randomly select 64 documents as the test data. The Type 
of files be used to encryption is TXT format documents. We ana- 
lyze and compare our scheme with Chen et al.’s scheme and Xu 
et al.’s scheme based on the real-world dataset from enron email 
dataset with the number of documents, distinct keywords and dis- 
tinct keyword-document pairs are 2 6 , 2 6 and 2 8 , respectively. We 
evaluate the time cost of the blind signaure algorithm, the PEKS 
4 http://gas.dia.unisa.it/projects/jpbc/java-docs/api/index.html. 
5 http://gas.dia.unisa.it/projects/jpbc/docs/pairing.html. 
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Fig. 6. The time cost of search. 
algorithm, the trapdoor generation algorithm and the time cost of 
search. We evaluate the time cost of the algorithms by using the 
average time cost by 10 0 0 rounds. 
As shown in Fig. 3 , in the blind signature algorithm, the time 
cost of our scheme is obviously more than Chen et al. scheme be- 
cause we make our ABO lossy encryption scheme function on the 
first message in normal blind signature scheme. More precise, the 
computation time for 50 keywords is 0.29s for Chen et al.’s scheme 
and our scheme is 1.18s. There is no blinding process in Xu et al.’s 
scheme. ( Figs. 4–6 ) 
The time cost of the PEKS algorithm and the trapdoor genera- 
tion algorithm are shown in. 
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